Mixed-signal circuit and system design for high performance applications is our primary research focus. Special emphasis is placed on advanced analog circuits for power delivery, hardware security, and machine learning ICs. The application of analog design techniques to emerging, mixed-signal technologies is exploited to optimize overall system performance. Emphasis is also placed on design methodologies, system architectures, and EDA techniques for integrated communication, synchronization, and power delivery systems. Optimization of the application-specific design process and system characteristics is addressed at multiple levels of IC design hierarchy. A primary objective is to develop a synergistic combination of carefully co-designed circuits, algorithms, architectures, and methodologies.

Intelligent Secure On-Chip Power Delivery and Management

The future of heterogeneous, high performance systems is strongly dependent upon the power delivery system, and deeply affected by the quality and efficiency of the on-chip power, availability of fine grain dynamically controlled voltage levels, and the ability to manage power in real-time. The general approach is to apply localized intelligence as an integrated element of modern power delivery and managements systems, addressing the challenges of system-wide efficiency, quality of power, stability of parallel connected on-chip power supplies, and hardware security.

Mixed-Signal and Analog Circuits

State-of-the-art on-chip and in-package voltage regulators, secure interface circuits, circuits for signal sensing and filtering, feedback loops, and circuit level means for dynamic real-time control are a primary concern in highly complex heterogeneous systems. The application of analog design techniques to emerging, mixed-signal technologies is exploited to optimize overall system performance.

Hardware Security

Hardware attacks are widely used to reduce the performance and/or life-time of computing devices, and decode encrypted information based on the co-analysis of stored data and leaking information. Clock, power, and electromagnetic sensors have been exploited to obtain information within side channel attacks. Secure interface circuits, policies, and architectures for electronic/alternative mixed-signaling are investigated in this research.